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An often-cited difficulty with moving low-income families out of welfare and into the labor force
is the lack of health insurance in many low-wage jobs.  Consequently, many low-income
household heads may be reluctant to leave welfare and thereby lose health insurance coverage for
their children.  The expansions in the Medicaid program to cover low-income children and
pregnant women who are not eligible for cash benefits may help alleviate the problem by
allowing disadvantaged household heads to accept jobs which do not provide health insurance. 
We use a discrete time (monthly) hazard rate model and data from several panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation to assess whether expansion of public health insurance to
cover children of working parents contributes to increase transitions out of welfare and into
employment and reduce transitions into welfare and out of employment.  We model spells in
progress and spells that start during the sample separately, which allows us to assess the effect on
long-term welfare recipients.  We find some evidence that expanded Medicaid eligibility for
children leads single mothers to exit welfare more quickly; however the effects are not robust to
the inclusion of year effects.  In addition, the effect appears to be strongest and most consistent
among long-term recipients (as proxied by recipients who begin the sample on welfare).  We find
less evidence of an effect of expanded Medicaid eligibility on transitions into welfare.  A
somewhat surprising finding is that higher AFDC income limits also appear to have little effect
on the probability of such transitions.  1
I. Introduction
In the last decade there have been two major policy initiatives aimed at low-income
individuals.  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996,
which "reformed" welfare programs, contained many provisions intended to move women from
receiving welfare to becoming employed.  The other policy initiative, which began in the mid-
1980s and continues today, was an expansion of the public health insurance program Medicaid to
cover low-income pregnant women and children who were ineligible for cash assistance.  These
two policy initiatives, while enacted independently, may in fact prove complementary.  An often-
cited difficulty with moving low-income families out of welfare and into the labor force is the
lack of health insurance in many low-wage jobs.  Only about 43 percent of workers with hourly
wages of $7 or less are offered health insurance by their employer, in contrast with a greater than
80 percent offer rate among higher-paid workers (Cooper and Schone, 1997).  Consequently,
many low-income household heads may be reluctant to leave welfare and thereby lose health
insurance coverage for their children.  The expansions in the Medicaid program to cover low-
income children and pregnant women who are not eligible for cash benefits may help alleviate
the problem by allowing disadvantaged household heads to accept jobs which do not provide
health insurance.  In this paper, we assess how expansions of public health insurance to cover
children of working parents affect welfare participation and labor supply, focusing on whether
such expansions contribute to ease transitions out of  welfare to work and whether these
expansions reduce transitions from employment or time spent off welfare. 
Previous research in this area using cross-sectional data (e.g. Yelowitz, 1995) found
evidence that Medicaid eligibility is associated with a higher probability of employment and a2
lower probability of welfare participation.  However expansions in public health insurance can
affect the probability that a woman is currently on welfare either by increasing the exit rate from
welfare or by reducing the entry rate into welfare.  Similarly, Medicaid expansions can affect the
probability that a women is employed at a point in time by affecting the average duration of an
employment spell and the average duration of a non-employment spell.  In this paper we use a
discrete time (monthly) hazard rate model and data from several panels of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) to examine these effects in a dynamic framework.  Specifically,
we examine the effect of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits and
Medicaid expansions on: i) the transition rates into and out of welfare; ii) the transition rates into
and out of employment; iii) the specific transition rate from welfare to employment and iv) the
specific transition rate from employment to welfare.  This approach is particularly appropriate to
the problem since it allows us to examine the sources of decreases in welfare participation
probabilities, leading to a greater understanding of the mechanism by which Medicaid
expansions can affect participation in welfare and employment.  This distinction can aid policy,
since for example programs that increase employment duration have additional benefits, such as
increased human capital accumulation.
Our framework also allows us to examine whether expanded eligibility for children
affects long-term welfare recipients differently from individuals who have been on welfare for
only a short time.  Previous work on welfare (see e.g., Blank 1989) has shown that some welfare
recipients have a low probability of leaving welfare (and hence longer spells) while others are
likely to leave welfare more quickly.  We examine these two groups (long-term and short-term
recipients) by considering spells on welfare that are in progress at the beginning of the sampling3
period (and which are thus likely to contain more long-term welfare recipients) separately from
spells which begin during the sampling period.  Determining how each group responds to the
expansions is likely to be of considerable interest to policy makers given the interest in moving
long-term recipients off welfare on a permanent basis.  
We have not yet been able to address all of the above issues, and our results should be
considered preliminary.  We find some evidence that expanded Medicaid eligibility for children
leads single mothers to exit welfare or non-employment more quickly; however the effects are
not robust to the inclusion of year effects.  In addition, the effect appears to be strongest and most
consistent among long-term recipients (as proxied by recipients who begin the sample on
welfare).  We find less evidence of an effect of expanded Medicaid eligibility on transitions into
welfare or non-employment.  A somewhat surprising finding is that while higher AFDC income
limits (or benefits) have a strong effect in terms of reducing the exit rate from welfare or non-
employment, they appear to have little or no effect on rate at which individuals enter welfare or
non-employment. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we summarize
the legislative background of the Medicaid expansions and discuss previous research relevant to
this paper.  In Section III we describe the economic models and the implied econometric
approaches that we consider. Section IV is a description of the data, including a discussion of
how we capture the effects of the expansions.  In Section V we present our preliminary empirical
results for some of the models discussed in Section III. We conclude the paper and discuss future
work in Section VI.1These laws included the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1986 and 1987, the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act and Family Support Act of 1988, OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990.  For a more detailed
discussion of the provisions of these laws and their effective dates, see Shore-Sheppard (1997).
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II. Background
Medicaid is a joint state-federal program providing health insurance to three groups of
Americans: low-income aged and disabled people; the "medically needy"–people who qualify for
coverage because of large medical expenses; and low-income families with children. 
Historically, Medicaid eligibility among the third and largest group was tied to eligibility for
AFDC.  Because AFDC eligibility depended partly on family structure, and because the
program’s income limit in most states was well below the federal poverty line, the tie to AFDC
meant that through the late 1980s, Medicaid covered less than half the families with incomes
below the poverty line.  It also meant that if a woman were to leave welfare, she and her children
would lose their Medicaid coverage.  Starting in the mid-1980s, a series of federal laws
uncoupled Medicaid eligibility from AFDC eligibility, expanding the population eligible for
Medicaid to include poor pregnant women and children previously ineligible for AFDC.
1 
Following the federal expansions, many states expanded their Medicaid programs further to
include children not covered by the federal mandates.  
These laws removed family structure restrictions (allowing children in two-parent
families to qualify) and increased the Medicaid income threshold well above the AFDC threshold
(to between 100% and 185% of the poverty line and sometimes higher, depending on the year,
state of residence, and age of the child), which increased both Medicaid eligibility and coverage
substantially.  The population of women ages 15 to 45 who would be eligible for Medicaid if
they became pregnant doubled between 1987 and 1992 (Cutler and Gruber, 1996), while among5
children under 15 between 1987 and 1995 the population eligible increased from 17 percent to 31
percent and participation in the program increased from 16 percent to 25 percent (Shore-
Sheppard, 1997). 
The perceived importance of the Medicaid program in funding health care for children is
clear: Medicaid was explicitly exempted from the welfare reform provisions enacted in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996, which eliminated AFDC and
replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  Categorical
Medicaid eligibility continues to be determined as it had been in the past.  In addition, in
response to pressure from states and the continuing decline in private insurance coverage for
children, in the summer of 1997 Congress and the President enacted a law creating the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) which provides states with $40 billion over the
next ten years in block grant funding (the largest increase in public spending on insurance for
children in three decades) to expand further publicly-provided health insurance for children.  
While static models of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on welfare and labor force
participation have been estimated using cross-sectional data, the results from these studies have
yielded mixed evidence on the effect of health insurance on welfare.  In addition, all studies of
the impact of Medicaid on labor supply and welfare participation done thus far have used a static
(cross-sectional) framework.  One difficulty that researchers have faced is how to identify
separately the impact of Medicaid on labor supply from the impact of other programs such as
AFDC and Food Stamps.  Both Blank (1989) and Winkler (1991) calculate a state-specific value
of Medicaid and include it in AFDC participation, labor force participation, and hours worked
equations.  They find generally small and usually statistically insignificant effects of the value of2In addition to movements in and out of the labor force, public health insurance may have an effect on job-
changing behavior as suggested by the literature on health insurance and job mobility, or "job-lock" (see e.g.
Madrian (1994), Holtz-Eakin (1994), or Buchmueller and Valetta (1996).)  We do not examine these potential
effects in this study, but intend to consider them in future work.
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Medicaid.   Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) develop a family-specific proxy for the value of Medicaid
and include it in cross-sectional probit equations of AFDC participation and employment.  They
find effects of Medicaid that are larger in magnitude than found previously, statistically
significant, and of the sign predicted by theory, with more valuable Medicaid benefits leading to
higher rates of AFDC participation and lower rates of labor force participation.  However when
they allow the effect of Medicaid to differ for families with low and high values of Medicaid,
their estimates indicate that only families with high expected medical expenditures alter their
AFDC participation or employment decisions in response to Medicaid availability.  
Yelowitz (1995) uses the first few years of Medicaid expansions to examine the  effect of
Medicaid, comparing AFDC and labor force participation among mothers with a child eligible
for Medicaid under the expansion to mothers without a child eligible for Medicaid.  Using a
static probit model and data from the CPS, he concludes that women with higher levels of
Medicaid eligibility for their children independent of AFDC eligibility are more likely to work
and less likely to participate in AFDC.  Unfortunately, the way the expansions are parameterized
in this study does not allow the effects of increases in Medicaid eligibility to be identified
separately from any decreases in AFDC eligibility that may be occurring.  Consequently, his
results do not provide clear evidence that Medicaid eligibility affects employment and AFDC
participation.
2
Our research project integrates work on Medicaid with the literature on the use of
longitudinal data to study welfare participation decisions and patterns.  An early paper by7
O'Neill, Bassi, and Wolf (1987) examines how the characteristics of welfare recipients influence
the time they spend on welfare.  They use annual data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Young Women to estimate a discrete duration model of the probability of leaving welfare and
find that spell duration is related to various characteristics of potential recipients, including
number of children, education, and health status.  They conclude that recipients with long spells
differ in predictable ways from those experiencing short spells.  Blank (1989) also studies the
determinants of the length of a spell on welfare, using monthly data from the Seattle/Denver
Income Maintenance Experiments and a more complex duration model which incorporates
unobserved heterogeneity and a competing risk framework.  She finds little evidence that the
probability of ending a spell is strongly affected by how long the spell has lasted (duration
dependence).  Instead she concludes that there appears to be two groups in the population of
recipients—one group with a low probability of leaving welfare (and hence longer spells) and
another group which is likely to leave welfare more quickly.
More recently, several papers have used the SIPP to examine welfare durations. 
Fitzgerald (1991) uses the 1984 panel to examine welfare durations, focusing on the effects of
measures of spouse availability in addition to previously examined determinants.  His basic
results are consistent with Blank's (1989) results, and in addition he finds some evidence that
spouse availability affects welfare durations for white women, although not for black women. 
Blank and Ruggles (1996) use the 1986 and 1987 panels of the SIPP to describe dynamic patterns
in the relationship between eligibility and participation in AFDC and Food Stamps.  They show
that many spells of eligibility do not lead to a spell of participation, and that spells which end in
participation tend to be concentrated among women for whom the expected benefit is higher. 8
They estimate a competing risk model where spells of eligibility or participation may end either
with a family composition change or an income or other change, and find significant differences
in the determinants of the two types of transition rates.
Our study investigates the effect of Medicaid eligibility on all transitions out of welfare,
as well as transitions due to a spell ending in employment.  Moreover, our study examines the
effect of Medicaid eligibility on transitions from employment to non-employment, as well as
transitions from employment (off welfare) to welfare. Thus we consider the effects of Medicaid
expansions on transitions into and out of welfare and non-employment. We analyze spells in
progress at the start of the sampling frame as well as fresh spells that begin after the start of the
sample period.  Previous studies have focused on fresh spells to avoid the econometric problems
that arise with interrupted spells (Heckman and Singer 1984).  However, this approach has the
disadvantage that most long-term welfare recipients will be in the midst of a spell on welfare
when the sample begins and are unlikely to have a fresh spell within the sampling period.  We
follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and use a separate hazard function (and unobserved
heterogeneity term) for spells in progress at the beginning of the sample as a means of
investigating the experience of long-term welfare recipients.
III. Economic Models and Econometric Approaches
In this section we consider three different economic models concerning the effect of
Medicaid expansions on employment status.  For each economic model, we then develop the
corresponding econometric model.  In each case we consider the simplest possible theoretical
model that can generate the corresponding econometric model.  3 Thus there is no distinction between out of the labor force and unemployment in this model.
4 One can drop the assumption of no borrowing or saving while maintaining the same structure of the
problem by imposing two-stage budgeting. See, e.g., Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1999).
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III.1 A Simple Labor Force Participation Model
We first consider a standard static participation model with fixed costs (see, e.g. Cogan
1980), since this theoretical model leads to the econometric specification used on cross-section
data by many of the existing studies of the effect of Medicaid expansions on employment status
or welfare participation.  Thus we analyze the empirical implications of this model when panel
data are available.  To begin, we assume that a woman can find employment whenever she wants
with zero search costs.
3  Individuals face a static budget constraint in each period (there is no
borrowing or saving),
4 and utility is additively separable over time.  Thus individuals maximize
utility period by period.  Current period utility is given by U(yit,lit; θit  ), where yit denotes income,
lit denotes leisure, and θit denotes unobserved taste variation across individuals.  For simplicity,
we assume that anyone not employed receives welfare benefits Bit, as well as Medicaid
insurance, which we assume has a cash value Mit.  Such an individual also consumes T units of
leisure, and thus her utility is U(Bit+Mit,T; θit ). For someone who works, we assume for
simplicity that hours of work are fixed at hit and that she receives wit dollars per hour of work
(there is no wage offer distribution for a given individual, although wages differ across
individuals.)  In the absence of welfare payments, each individual  has no unearned income and
thus utility while working is given by U(wit hit , T-hit ; θit ).
The probability that a woman works is given by Pr(I=U(wit hit , T-hit ; θit ) - U(Bit +Mit , T;
θit ) >0).  Now suppose Medicaid is expanded such that she becomes eligible for Medicaid
insurance for some of her children (and possibly herself through a state waiver program) which5 It is straightforward to relax many of our assumptions without changing the basic results.  For example, to
allow for variable hours of work, one simply evaluates utility while working at the optimal hours hit*. 
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has a cash value M1.  Her utility while working is now U(wit hit +M1,T-hit ; θit ). and thus the
probability that she works is now given by Pr(I*=U(wit hit +M1 , T-hit ; θit ) - U(Bit +Mit ,T; θit )
>0).
5  To implement this model empirically, we follow the literature (e.g. Mroz 1987) and




it  Zitγ  uit
 Zitγ  vi  εit .
The vector Zit contains variables describing the characteristics of the family and the mother Xit,
variables that proxy AFDC generosity AFDCnst for a family of size n in state s, and
unemployment rates URst. Then we assume that an individual is employed in period t if I
*
it > 0. 
(In the literature researchers analyze i) whether an individual is not employed in a given period
and ii) whether an individual is on welfare in a given period somewhat interchangeably. We
focus on employment determination here to save space, but discuss below jointly estimating
welfare status and employment status.) Note that we have broken the overall error term uit into an
individual-specific error term, vi,  and a individual-period-specific error term, εit.  If we treat  vi as
independent of the explanatory variables in (1), then we will have something analogous to a
random effects limited dependent variable model, although we may also want to allow the εit to
be correlated over time for a given individual.  In either case, if we assume that uit has a
multivariate normal distribution, we would have a multivariate probit model.  6 Of course, this model raises difficult issues of whether those employed last period have a higher
employment rate this period because of taste differences or because of true state dependence in the employment
probabilities.  We will attempt to distinguish between these possibilities in the econometric approach discussed
below.
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III.2. A Simple Stationary Dynamic Participation Model 
One possible criticism of the theoretical labor supply model described above is that it
assumes that a woman can find a job instantaneously and at zero cost.  In terms of our empirical
work, this assumption implies that whether an individual is employed in the previous period does
not affect the probability of her being employed this period.  For many individuals this is too
strong an restriction, since we would expect someone who had a job last month to be more likely
to be employed this month.
6  We attempt to allow for this possibility in the following simple
economic model by assuming that finding a job usually involves incurring search costs as well as
randomness in job offers, so that even if a woman looks for a job, she may not find a job that
period.  The model is based on Burdett and Mortensen (1977) and Blundell, Ham and Meghir
(1999), and will generate a richer econometric model that allows the probability of being
employed (and the effect of the independent variables such as the Medicaid provisions on the
probability of being employed) to depend on previous employment status.
Specifically, we modify the above fixed cost participation model in the following fashion. 
A woman can only find a job by searching, and if she searches from unemployment, she incurs
monetary search costs s.  Conditional on searching, she has a probability α of obtaining a job
offer.  Individuals who are employed lose their job with probability β.  We continue to assume
that individuals satisfy a static budget constraint in each period and that each individual faces a
single wage (as opposed to a wage offer distribution).  Further, we assume that the model is
stationary in the sense that all variables are constant over time.  There are three possible labor7 Note that this formulation of utility assumes that there are no time costs of searching.  Relaxing this
assumption would not change the results.
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market states: i) non-participation in the labor force, ii) searching for a job, and iii) working. 
Since search today affects employment prospects next period, we can no longer analyze the
individual’s participation decision separately period by period.  For someone who does not
participate in the labor force, current period utility is again given by 
(4a) Uot  U(Bit  Mit,T).
An individual who searches this period has current utility  given by   
(4b)
7  Ust  U(Bit  Mit  s,T).
Finally, an individual who is currently working has current period utility given by 
(4c) Uet  U(withit, T  hit)
The value function for an individual who does not participate is given by 
(5a) ,  Vot  Uot  (1 ρ)1Vot1
where ρ is the discount rate.  
Similarly, the value function for someone searching is given by
(5b) , Vst  Ust  (1 ρ)1 [αVet1  (1 α)Vst1]
and the value function for an employed individual is given by
(5c) . Vet  Uet  (1 ρ)1[(1 β)Vet1  βVst1]8We are assuming that to find her first job an individual had to search from unemployment, and thus will
prefer employment to non-employment.
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Since the model is stationary, the value function is the same each period.  Using this fact,
reduced form versions of the value functions can be derived in terms of the parameters and the
utility functions (see, e.g. Blundell, Ham and Meghir 1999):
(5ak). Vo  ρ1Uo
(5bk), Vs  ρ1 ρ  β
ρ  α β
Us  α
ρ  α  β
Ue
(5ck). Ve  ρ1 β
ρ  α  β
Us  ρ  α
ρ  α  β
Ue
The probability that a woman searches is just  , which depends positively on utility Pr(Vs>Vo)
while working, and the probability that a woman moves from non-employment to employment is
.  The probability of an individual leaving employment is simply the layoff rate β, Pr(Ve > Vo) ] α
since given our stationarity assumptions, an individual will never voluntarily leave employment
for non-employment unless something in the model changes.
8 
Now consider the Medicaid expansions. These expansions raise the current period utility
for employment, and thus raise the value function for both employment and search, but not the
value of non-participation.  As a result, the expansions increase the probability that an individual
searches, and thus the probability that she leaves non-employment for employment.  On the other
hand, the layoff rate β is constant by assumption.  Since increasing current period utility while
employed will never induce anyone to leave employment for out-of-the-labor-force, the9 To see this, subtract equation (5a’) from (5b’) and differentiate this expression with respect to benefits
(B).  A sufficient condition for an increase in benefits to reduce unambiguously the transition rate from non-
employment to employment is for the utility function to be linear in income.
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expansions have no effect on the transition rate between employment and non-employment in
this model.
For comparison, consider the case where the Medicaid provisions are constant but AFDC
benefits increase.  For some individuals, this increase in benefits will raise current period utility
while not searching, Uo , above current period utility while working, Ue . In this case, the
individual will quit work.  Thus we would expect an increase in AFDC benefits to increase the
transition rate from employment to non-employment.  An increase in benefits will also affect the
probability that an individual who is out of work searches.  We would expect an increase in
benefits to reduce the transition rate from non-employment to employment, although there is the
possibility that the effect is ambiguous.
9  This discussion suggests that the probability an
individual is employed in a given period depends in an important way on whether she was
employed in the previous period. The simplest way to capture this is to generalize the probit
equation (1) by allowing lagged employment status to enter the index function
(6) , I

it  Zitγ  δIit1  vi  εit
where Iit-1 equals one if the individual was employed last period and zero otherwise.  This
extension is a simple way to account for possible serial persistence in employment or welfare
participation, which none of the existing studies of Medicaid's effects are able to do (as they all
use cross-sectional data).  This model has been previously estimated in similar contexts by Chay
and Hyslop (1998) and by Keane and Wolpin (1998).  10 This is also true in the index function (6) that contains a dummy variable denoting last period’s
employment status. 
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Note, however, that (6) constrains a variable to have essentially the same coefficient in
the transition rate from employment to nonemployment and in the transition rate from
nonemployment to employment.  This condition will be violated, for example, in the simple
model defined by (5ak) through (5ck), where expanding Medicaid eligibility would only affect
transitions from non-employment to employment and not vice-versa.  Further, while we would
expect changes in AFDC benefits to affect both transitions into employment and transitions out
of employment, we may not expect the effects to be governed by a single coefficient. Thus we
consider a more general model where we essentially interact lagged employment status with each
explanatory variable.  We assume that an individual who was employed last period is employed
this period if 
(7a) I

eit  Zeitγe  ueit >0
Further, we assume that an individual who was not employed last period is not employed this
period if  
(7b) I

neit  Zneitγne  uneit >0
Finally, we must specify an equation for the initial period in our data to avoid selection bias in
our estimation.
10  We assume that an individual is employed in the initial period if 
(7c) . I

oi  Zoiγo  uoi >011The t subscript is dropped when k=0 in (8) and (9).
12Alternatively, one could assume that they follow a normal distribution. 
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One advantage of the above specification is that it allows us to measure the effect of AFDC
benefits on transitions into non-employment.  As noted above, the previous literature has focused
almost exclusively on the effect on transitions out of non-employment.  
  To save space, we do not consider a general specification of the likelihood for this model.
Instead, we only examine a simple example. In our work, we assume that each of the error terms
in (7a) through (7c) follows an error components specification, 
(8)  , k = e, ne, 0, uikt  vik  εikt
where 0 denotes the initial period,
11 and that each of the idiosyncratic error terms εit follow a
logistic distribution.
12  Then the index functions in (7a) through (7c) define the following
probabilities
(9) . Pik(tGvki)  (1  exp(Ziktγk  vki), k  e, ne,0
Consider the following labor market history.  The individual is not employed in the initial period. 
She makes a transition from non-employment to employment at time t1, and makes a transition
from employment to non-employment at time t2.  The last period observed is period T.  Her





1  P0(1Gv0) ‰
t11
j1








1  pne(jGvne) dH(v0, vne, ve)13 In fact one may want to go further, and distinguish out of the labor force from in the labor force and
looking for a job in the estimation.
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where H(v0,vne,ve) is the distribution function for the individual-specific errors.  We will use the
one factor model used by Ham and LaLonde (1996), as well as the approach of McCall (1996), to
model H( ] ).  
Note that the model (7a) to (7c)  can be viewed as a estimating a duration model with no
duration dependence in either transition rate. Thus, the steady-state probability of being
employed in this model is given by











One may view the probit approach (1) as estimating the determinants of (11) directly. This raises
the question of what we gain by estimating the transition probabilities from employment to non-
employment (7a) and non-employment to employment (7b) separately, as opposed to simply
estimating equation (11) directly. We would argue that there are several advantages to estimating
the transition rates separately. First, if we are to understand how Medicaid expansions (and other
explanatory variables) affect employment status (rather than viewing the mechanism as a black
box), we need to understand how the expansions affect the different components determining
employment status.
13  Second, examining entries and exits separately may be useful in policy
design.  For example, if the expansions aid entry into employment but do not reduce exits from14An example is the National Supported Work training program, which appears to reduce the transition rate
out of employment but does not affect the transition rate out of non-employment.  This is in contrast to Job Training
Partnership Act classroom training, which appears to affect only the transition rate out of non-employment.  See
Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997) for details.
15We assume that the arrival rate becomes fixed after a certain point in order to induce stationarity into the
model at some point.
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employment, then policy makers may want to focus additional welfare reform efforts on
strategies that reduce employment exits.
14  
III.3. A Simple Dynamic Participation Model with Duration Dependence 
As noted above, our labor force participation model defined by (5a) through (5c)
produces a model equivalent to a duration model with no duration dependence.  Researchers
working with duration data on disadvantaged women have found evidence of duration
dependence, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.  To obtain a theoretical model
which exhibits duration dependence, we modify our labor force participation model, again
aiming for the simplest possible theoretical model that would produce this effect in the data. 
Specifically, we now assume that the arrival rate of job offers falls with the length of time that a
person has been out of employment.  Thus
(12a)
αt  α(t), α <0 for t < ta
 ¯ α for t A ta
where t is the length of time non-employed in the current spell.
15  We also assume that the layoff
rate out of employment, β, falls with the length of time in the current employment spell
(12b) .
βt  β(t), β <0 for t < tb
 ¯ β for t A tb16As a practical matter, allowing for duration dependence may be important since the Medicaid eligibility
variables will be trending upward for most or all waves of SIPP, and they could also pick up duration dependence
effects if we ignore them.
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In this model the value function for searching falls with the duration of the current  non-
employment spell.  This is because the job offer arrival rate falls with current duration, and thus
the transition rate out of non-employment must fall with length of time in the spell. Further, as
one would expect, these modifications also lead to negative duration dependence in the transition
rate out of employment. 
  Thus we next consider a duration model with duration dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity.
16  Here we focus on time spent on welfare and off welfare, rather than time spent
in employment, to make this section more comparable with previous research.  (We discuss
combining an analysis of both employment and welfare below.)  In a data set such as the SIPP
there are four types of welfare and non-welfare spells:
(i) spells on welfare in progress at the start of the sampling frame (interrupted welfare
spells);
(ii) spells on welfare that begin after the start of the sampling frame (fresh welfare spells);
(iii) spells off welfare in progress at the start of the sampling frame (interrupted spells off
welfare);
(iv) spells off welfare that begin after the start of the sampling frame (fresh spells off
welfare).
As discussed above, previous research has focused on fresh welfare spells, omitting data on
interrupted welfare spells and time spent off welfare. This has the advantage that one can obtain
parameters of the hazard function for a new spell for a woman chosen at random, which would17One advantage of our approach is that we can incorporate the fact that the implicit tax rate on earnings
above deductions is approximately 100% after 4 months of being on welfare. We intend to do this in future work.
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not generally be true if one combined data on fresh and interrupted spells to estimate a common
set of parameters. However, it has the disadvantage that one will not see spell lengths of more
than two or three years. By estimating a separate hazard for interrupted spells we can focus on
long term welfare recipients also. Further, by jointly analyzing time in the spells i) through iv),
we eliminate any selection bias in the estimates.
Researchers have defined a hazard function for leaving a fresh welfare spell in terms of
variables describing the characteristics of the family and the mother Xit, variables that proxy
AFDC generosity AFDCnst,
17 and unemployment rates URst.  We define a hazard function in
terms of these variables as well as a vector of variables that proxy Medicaid eligibility Mednst. 
Assuming a logit functional form, we have
(13a) λw(rG., θw)  1
1  exp((yw(rG θw)))
where
(13b) .
yw(rGθw)  hw(r)  γ1wXit  γ2wMednst  γ3wAFDCnst
γ4wURst  θw
In equations (13a) and (13b), r represents the current duration of the fresh welfare spell and θw
represents an unobserved heterogeneity component.  Previous researchers have not analyzed
interrupted spells since deriving the appropriate density function for time remaining in an
interrupted spell in terms of the parameters of (13a) and (13b) is extremely complicated in the18Calculating this contribution is straightforward if there is no unobserved heterogeneity and the start date
of the spell is known.
19Although this approach has not been used to analyze welfare spells, Ham and LaLonde (1996) and
Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde (1997) use this approach to analyze the effect of being offered or receiving training
on transitions between employment and nonemployment of disadvantaged women.
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presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
18  However the interrupted spells are likely to contain
important information on long term welfare recipients, particularly in a relatively short panel
such as SIPP, and thus it is quite desirable to analyze these spells.  To do this, we follow the
pragmatic suggestion of Heckman and Singer (1984) and specify a separate hazard function and
heterogeneity term for spells in progress at the start of the sampling period
(14) . λw (r Gθw )  1
1  exp((yw (r Gθw )))
In (14), rk represents the length of time since the start of the sample, wk denotes an interrupted
spell, and the argument is along the same lines as (13b) with different parameters.  We
emphasize that this is only an approximate solution to the problems created by left censoring, but
it does allow us to utilize data on interrupted spells.
19  
As noted above we will also analyze spells off welfare.  There are two reasons such spells
should be analyzed.  First, it allows us to investigate whether welfare benefit levels or Medicaid
eligibility affect transitions into welfare.  Such entry effects could be important if, for example,
preventing initial entry into welfare has long-run consequences for welfare participation. 
Second, if the hazard functions for entering welfare depend on unobserved heterogeneity terms
which are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the hazard functions for leaving
welfare, there is the possibility of selection bias if one only analyzes time spent on welfare20See Appendix 2 of Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde 1997 for a detailed discussion of this issue. Note that
we are not focusing on the bias that occurs (even with random assignment) within a spell because of unobserved
heterogeneity (Ridder and Verbakel 1984).
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(Heckman and Singer 1984).  For example, suppose expanded Medicaid eligibility reduces the
probability of an individual entering welfare.  Then those who enter welfare when they face high
Medicaid eligibility standards will be those with a high heterogeneity term (for leaving time
spent off welfare) and, under standard assumptions, will have an unobserved heterogeneity term
that makes it less likely that they leave a fresh spell on welfare.  This will create a negative
correlation between Medicaid eligibility and the unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard function
for leaving a fresh spell of welfare. 
20  We specify similar hazard functions for time spent in
interrupted and fresh spells off welfare to those for time spent on welfare. We will jointly
estimate the parameters of the hazard functions for the interrupted and fresh spells on and off
welfare, maximizing the appropriate likelihood function while allowing the unobserved
heterogeneity terms to be correlated across the spells.  Note that several of the explanatory
variables, (e.g. welfare and Medicaid values or income limits, family size and state
unemployment rates) change with time and thus help to identify the parameters of the joint
likelihood.  Our use of the time-changing variables gives us an exclusion restriction in the sense
that the values of these variables from the interrupted spells affect the fresh spells only through
the selection process. Thus, they help control for the selection bias in terms of the fresh spells
discussed above.  Since this type of model has been estimated for disadvantaged women by, e.g.,21 These papers were concerned with the effect of training on employment histories, and did not consider
the effect of AFDC benefits or Medicaid on such histories. An additional difference between our approach and
these studies is that we will also estimate an equation along the lines of (7a) to describe the initial state, since this
will be helpful in performing simulations of long-run and short-run effects.  (These earlier studies could not
separately identify the parameters determining the initial state in their data.)  In our work we will let the initial state
depend on demand conditions before the start of the sample period, while the transition rates out of the current and
lagged spells will depend on current demand conditions. The timing of the demand conditions gives us an exclusion
restriction which will help identify the model.
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Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997), we omit describing the
likelihood function here.
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III.4. Analyzing Welfare Status and Employment Status Jointly
Until now we have followed the literature and treated i) non-employment and ii) welfare
receipt as essentially synonymous; we have also treated iii) employment and iv) off-welfare as
synonymous.  As noted above we intend to estimate each of the above models first specifying the
respective dependent variable in terms of employment/non-employment and then specifying it in
terms of on-welfare/off-welfare.  However, many individuals who are not employed are not on
welfare, and as previous researchers have noted (see, e.g. Engberg, Gottschalk, and Wolf 1990), a
substantial number of individuals on welfare are also employed, so that it is useful to analyze
welfare participation and employment status jointly.  One possibility would be to estimate each
of the above models jointly; for example in the case of the random effects probit specification,
we could estimate a bivariate probit model in terms of welfare status and employment status. 
This would lead to a potential increase in efficiency as compared to separate estimation.  On the
other hand, many of the models already involve relatively complex estimation, and this new
estimation approach will make things significantly harder.  There are two straightforward ways in
which we can address this problem.  First we can estimate the models separately and then22 We face the issue that estimating welfare status and employment status separately will not allow us to
recover the joint distribution of the unobservables, which would be helpful in estimation.  In some cases, we can
recover the joint distribution after separate estimation (see, e.g., Chamberlain 1984), just as one does in the
calculating the covariance matrix in a seemingly unrelated regression.  In the more complicated models we will have
to ignore any correlation between the unobservables. This generally will not lead to inconsistency, but will involve a
loss of efficiency in simulation.
23We can also examine other specific transitions of policy interest, such as employment on welfare to
employment off welfare.
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simulate them jointly, examining the short-run, medium run and long-run probabilities of the
effect of AFDC changes and Medicaid expansions on the probability that an individual is: i) off-
welfare and in employment, ii) on welfare and in employment, iii) on welfare and not employed,
and iv) off welfare and not employed.
22  Secondly, in the models defined by (9) and (10) and by
(13a) and (14), we will also look at the effect of the Medicaid expansions on specific transitions
from i) on welfare to employment off welfare and ii) off welfare and in employment to on
welfare, since we would expect the Medicaid expansions to have their biggest effects in these
cases.
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III.5. Important Statistical Issues: Model Fit, Seam Bias, and Spurious Transitions
For each of the models we face at least three additional issues.  First, how well do the
models fit the data?  One approach to testing the fit of the model is to save some data (either the
last few months of a given wave or one entire wave) and examine both the in-sample and out-of-
sample performance.  Here we would simulate the model and use goodness-of-fit statistics (e.g.,
Heckman and Walker 1990).  This would not only help us to understand the predicted short-run
and medium-run dynamics for each model, but would also help us to compare the performance of25
the different models.  Carrying out these simulations is relatively straightforward; see e.g.
Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde (1997).
A second issue we must face in each model is that of "seam bias."  Individuals are
interviewed in every four months in the SIPP, and Census Bureau researchers have shown that
there are a disproportionate number of transitions in the fourth (interview) month.  The approach
to this problem that has been used in the past is to use index functions or transition rates that
apply to the four month period covered by the interview.  However, this approach has the
disadvantage that a discrete time model cannot really handle an interval shorter than that for
which the index function is defined (see Flinn and Heckman 1982) and a four month interval can
be quite long when considering transitions in and out of employment.  In addition, information
on the timing of transitions that reportedly occurred in months other than the seam month is lost.
We plan to take a different approach and treat seam bias as a censoring problem given our
monthly data.  Consider the probit model defined by (1) and the following employment history.
An individual is employed at the beginning of the sample period and stays  employed up to
period t1, at which point she enters non-employment and stays there for the remainder of the
sample period.  For simplicity, assume that t1 is the first month of the four month period, and thus
within the four month interval I1 = 0, I2 = 0, I3 = 0, I4 = 0, where Ij is an indicator function equal
to 1 if the individual is employed in the jth month in the interval and zero otherwise.  Denote L1
as the likelihood for the case that the data are correct.  Next define L2 as the likelihood for the
case where she really makes the transition into month 2, i.e. the true data are I1 = 1, I2 = 0, I3 = 0,
I4 = 0.  Similarly let L3 denote the likelihood for the case where the true data are I1 = 1, I2 = 1, I3 =26
0, I4 = 0, and define L4 in a similar fashion.  Then one approach to seam bias is to use the
following as the contribution for each person to the likelihood function:
(15) L*=(L1 + L2+ L3+ L4)/4 .
In this procedure we would use (15) regardless of which of the four months in the interval a
transition was reported to have taken place.  Alternatively, we could make this adjustment only if
the transition is reported to have occurred in the last month in the interval, since seam bias
captures the idea that transitions in the earlier months in the interval are attributed to the last
month.  If we make the adjustment only in the last month, we may also want to estimate the
weights in (15) on each term rather than imposing a weight of one quarter.  
Further, one could test for seam bias by comparing estimates based on the likelihood (15)
with estimates based on the probit model using the reported data and a Hausman (1978) test. 
Under the null hypothesis of no seam bias, estimates based on the standard likelihood are
efficient, while those based on (15) are consistent but inefficient.  As a further test of the
robustness of our results, we will use both the method we propose and the previously-used
method of using only one observation per interview period and examine whether and how our
conclusions are affected.  Finally, if an individual has more than one transition, we would need to
extend this procedure.  This extension is straightforward but notationally cumbersome and we
omit it to save space.  The approach also is easily transferable to the duration models or to the
index function with the lagged dependent variable.  
A third problem we face is the possibility that our results may be driven by spurious
transitions where an individual is, for example, erroneously coded as employed in a given period
when in fact she is not employed in that period, and is not employed in the preceding or27
following periods.  One would suspect that the duration models might be especially sensitive to
this problem, since this type of coding error would to a spurious transition out of non-
employment and a spurious very short employment spell.  We will address this issue by recoding
the data to eliminate any spells of one month duration, and compare the results to the original
data.   Interestingly, for the duration models we have estimated so far (see the discussion of
preliminary results below), this change in coding makes no substantive difference in our results.  
In this version of the paper we focus first on the specific transition rate from employment
off welfare to welfare and the specific transition rate for welfare to employment off welfare,
using both interrupted and fresh spells.  We next focus on all transitions off welfare, again using
fresh and interrupted spells.  Finally we consider all exits from employment and all exits from
non-employment, using only interrupted spells.  We ignore unobserved heterogeneity in the
current version of the paper and estimate all transitions separately rather than estimating them
jointly.  We will estimate the more general model in future versions of the paper. 
IV. Data
Our data consist of a sample of spells of single motherhood for 15,998 women between
the ages of 18 and 55 drawn from the 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels of the
SIPP.  The six panels we use cover the period from October 1986 to December 1995, which was
the period during which Medicaid eligibility expanded most rapidly.   Each panel of the SIPP is
composed of four rotation groups which are interviewed three times a year about experiences
over the preceding four months, providing up to 28 months of data for the 1987 panel, 24 months
for the 1988 panel, 32 months for 1990 and 1991, 40 months for 1992, and 36 months for 1993. 24 To preserve confidentiality, the Census Bureau does not identify the state of residence for individuals in
low-population states.  Since our empirical strategy requires information about state of residence, only individuals in
the 42 uniquely identified states are used.  
25An AFDC participant is considered to have made a transition from welfare to employment if she exits
welfare and if in either the same month or the following month she reports being employed.  If she exits welfare and
does not become employed, the spell is treated as "censored" for the purpose of estimating the transition intensity
from welfare to employment.
26Approximately 3.3 percent of the 301,594 person-months in the data are months of both AFDC
participation and employment.
28
At each interview participants were asked about their experiences over the previous four months,
including questions about monthly changes in family composition, employment and participation
in cash transfer programs. In addition, the SIPP contains demographic information such as age,
education, and state of residence.
24  
We define a single mother as a currently unmarried woman caring for at least one child,
where a child is defined as an individual younger than age 18, or between 18 and 23 and a full-
time student.  For women who are not single mothers during all months of the data, only the
months of single motherhood are included in our sample.  From these spells of single
motherhood we identify time spent participating in welfare, time spent off welfare, time spent in
employment and time spent in non-employment.
25  Women who are both employed and on
welfare are counted as participating in welfare when examining transitions involving welfare,
and are counted as being employed when examining transitions out of employment without
regard to welfare.
26  
The bottom panel of Table 1A shows the number of welfare spells of each type
(interrupted and fresh) present in the data.  There are 3498 spells of welfare in progress at the
start of the sample.  Of these spells, fewer than half (1612) of them show a transition, with 943 of
the transitions being to employment.  Comparing spells in progress at the beginning of the29
sample with fresh spells, the fresh spells are shorter on average and are more likely to end with a
transition to employment. (Duration for the spells in progress is measured from the start of the
sample.)  This difference is not surprising, as women who begin the sample on AFDC are more
likely to be long-term AFDC participants than women whose spell starts during the sample (i.e.
have unobserved heterogeneity that makes them more likely to stay on welfare) or because of
negative duration dependence.
The rest of Table 1A shows the means of the variables we use in our analysis, as of the
first month of the welfare participation spell.  The demographic variables include the woman’s
age, the highest grade she completed, whether she is non-white, the number of children she has,
the number of her children who are under six years old, the age of her youngest child, and
whether she is divorced, separated, or widowed (the omitted category is never married).  From
the table, it appears that women with a spell in progress at the start of the sample are likely to be
slightly younger, to have completed fewer years of education, are more likely to be non-white,
and to have more children, particularly young children, than women who have a spell start during
the sample.
Table 1B gives the same information for spells of employment off welfare, and
employment and non-employment without regard to welfare.  Not surprisingly the values of the
demographic variables for women in the first month of a nonemployment spell are similar to the
values for women in the first month of a welfare spell.  However women in employment spells
are older, have completed more education, are less likely to be non-white, have fewer children,
and are more likely to be divorced than women in welfare spells.27These data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://stats.bls.gov/top20.html.
28We are grateful to David Neumark for providing us with the minimum wage data.
29This identification strategy has been used previously by (among others) Currie and Gruber (1996), Cutler
and Gruber (1996), Shore-Sheppard (1997), and Yelowitz (1995).
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Using the state of residence information available in the SIPP, we link information from
other sources to our data, including the monthly unemployment rate in the state,
27 the level of the
minimum wage in the state,
28 and the state AFDC and Medicaid eligibility standards.  We use the
state unemployment rate to proxy economic conditions women face, since during economic
downturns women will be less likely to exit welfare and more likely to enter it.  The minimum
wage and the AFDC and Medicaid eligibility standards are used to distinguish the women
affected by the Medicaid expansions.  
To identify the effect of the Medicaid expansions, we use the fact that the expansions
affected women differently depending on their state of residence, the size of their family, the age
of their children, and the year.
29  The Medicaid expansions took place over several years and
were implemented as phased-in federal mandates with optional provisions that states could enact. 
The phasing-in was done by age, with younger children becoming eligible sooner.  In addition,
eligibility standards were more lenient for younger children.  For example, consider a woman
with two children, an infant and a five-year old, living in Alabama or North Carolina.  Neither,
one, or both of her children are eligible according to the following standards for her family
income:31
1988 1990 1992
Alabama before July: neither eligible
after July: infant if  < 100%
of poverty 
before April: infant if
< 100% of poverty
after April: infant if <
133% of poverty
infant if < 133% of
poverty
5 yr old if < 100% of
poverty
North Carolina infant if < 100% of poverty infant if < 150% of
poverty
5 yr old if < 100% of
poverty
infant if < 185% of
poverty
5 yr old if < 100% of
poverty
This table illustrates that some women who are contemplating leaving AFDC will have some of
their children eligible for Medicaid, while others have none of their children eligible and still
others have all of their children eligible.  
The income levels also vary relative to the AFDC eligibility level in the state.  In states
which have very generous income cutoffs for AFDC eligibility, the expanded eligibility limits for
Medicaid represent a relatively smaller change in eligibility limits, while in states which have
very strict income standards for AFDC, the expansions produce a relatively large increase in the
eligibility limits for Medicaid.  We attempt to capture this variation in several ways in our
analysis.  First, since the youngest child in a family is the most likely to be eligible under the
expansions, we create variables which capture variation in eligibility for the youngest child.  One
such variable is the amount of money a woman could earn per month and still have her youngest
child be eligible for Medicaid.  This Medicaid income limit depends on the age of the youngest
child, the state of residence of the family, the month, and the size of the family, since the
legislated Medicaid income limits are in the form of a percent of the Federal poverty line, which30In the analysis which follows, we also tried using the Medicaid income limit as a percent of the poverty
line, but there was no difference in the results.
31This specification is similar to the variable used by Yelowitz (1995) but is less restrictive in the sense that
he constrains the variables to have coefficients which are equal in absolute value but are different in sign. In
general, this constraint is not satisfied in our data.  
32We also tried 30 hours, however there was no difference in the results.
32
differs by family size.
30   We calculate the AFDC income limit for the woman, which is a
function of the size of the woman’s family, the state AFDC need and payment standards, and the
child care and earnings disregards in effect at that time.  The Medicaid income limit for the
youngest child variable is thus measured as the maximum of the AFDC income limit and the
Medicaid income limit.  We include both it and the AFDC income limit in our analysis.
31 
Another variable we create is the fraction of the woman’s children who are eligible for Medicaid
only under the expansions (in that month) according to their age.  Thus a child would be
considered age-eligible in a month if there was a legislated expansion in place for that age child,
regardless of the income limit accompanying that expansion.  Our final Medicaid variable is the
fraction of a woman's children who would be eligible for Medicaid coverage if she worked 40
hours a week at the minimum wage.
32  This variable takes advantage of additional variation in
state Medicaid expansion levels and state minimum wage levels as well as the previously
discussed variation.  Both of these last two variables are intended to account for the fact that
women who have a larger fraction of their children who could be covered by Medicaid
independent of AFDC are more likely to respond to the expansions than women who have a
relatively small fraction of their children eligible since the value of Medicaid coverage under the
expansions is relatively higher for such women.  33
We show the variation in these AFDC and Medicaid variables in Table 2.  As expected,
all of the Medicaid variables show substantial increases over the time period, particularly
between 1990 and 1993.  The AFDC income limit also increases, although between 1991 and
1994 the limit increases very little.  The fraction of children age-eligible and the fraction who are
eligible if the mother works 40 hours a week at the minimum wage are virtually identical,
indicating that the income expansion levels are greater than a minimum-wage income for most
ages.  The values of these variables for the women with interrupted and fresh welfare spells are
shown at the bottom of Table 1A.  Unsurprisingly, the AFDC income limit is higher for women
with interrupted spells.  The Medicaid variables are slightly higher among women with spells in
progress at the start of the sample, however the difference is quite small.  
V. Results
Our estimates of the probability of leaving welfare for employment for the interrupted
spells (in progress at the start of the sampling frame) are contained in columns (1) through (6) of
Table 3A.  As noted above, this sample will contain the majority of the long term welfare
recipients, and thus is of particular interest for policy.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first duration study to focus on long-term recipients in this manner.  In each specification, we
include the AFDC income limit to control for variation in AFDC eligibility that will affect the
likelihood a woman exits welfare.  In addition, each specification includes one of the Medicaid
variables discussed above.  We estimate each specification with and without year effects (the
results with year effects are in the second column of each pair).  Columns (1) and (2) contain the
results using the maximum of the state Medicaid income limit for the youngest child and the33Recall that duration is measured from the start of the sampling period. In future work we will also
consider using total duration (from the beginning of the spell) instead. However, to obtain this variable we must
obtain additional data and thus it is not available for this draft. 
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AFDC income limit as the measure of Medicaid generosity.  In columns (3) and (4) we present
the results, with and without year dummies, from a specification including the fraction of
children eligible if the mother works 40 hours a week at the minimum wage, while in columns
(5) and (6) we use the fraction of children age-eligible under the expansions.  
To determine our specification of the duration dependence, we use the Schwartz criterion
(see, e.g., Judge et al. 1980, pp. 425-426) to choose the level of the polynomial in log duration. 
We use this criterion since it will lead to a more parsimonious specification of duration
dependence than the more standard likelihood ratio test, and in their monte carlo results, Baker
and Melino (1997) found that over-fitting duration dependence leads to small sample bias in the
parameter estimates. On this basis, we use a fourth order polynomial in duration dependence.
33 
For comparability, we use the level of duration dependence with time dummies that we chose
when omitting the time dummies.
The coefficients on the control variables change very little across specifications.  There
appears to be a nonlinear relationship between age and the probability of leaving welfare for
employment, with the probability declining with age to a minimum around age 42, then
increasing.  Being non-white and having more children (particularly children under 6)
significantly lowers the probability of leaving welfare for employment, while having more
education and being divorced, separated, or widowed (as compared to never married) increases
the probability.  Controlling for the number of children and the number less than six years old,
the age of the youngest child does not appear to affect the likelihood of moving from welfare to35
work, while the probability of leaving declines significantly with the state unemployment rate. 
Higher AFDC income limits significantly lower the probability of leaving welfare for a job, as
expected.  
If the Medicaid expansions increase transitions from welfare to employment, as
hypothesized, the coefficients on the Medicaid variables should be positive.  With the exception
of the Medicaid income limit in the specification with year dummies, the coefficients are indeed
positive, however only the variables measuring the fraction of the woman's children who are
eligible are significant, and only in the specifications without controls for year.  The year controls
are intended to capture unmeasured changes in the macroeconomy or national policy over time
that might affect the likelihood that a woman leaves welfare for employment.  If the
unemployment rate successfully captures such changes, including the year dummies may merely
absorb some of the variation in the Medicaid variables, leading to small and insignificant
estimates of the effects of Medicaid expansions.  However if the year dummies are picking up
important macroeconomic variation affecting welfare participation and employment and hence
belong in the equation, then the effect of expanded Medicaid eligibility on transitions from
welfare to employment appears to be small and insignificant. In future work we will add more
measures of demand shocks at the national level when we exclude year dummies.
Table 3B contains our empirical results estimating transitions to employment (off
welfare) using welfare spells  that begin after the start of the sample period.  As noted above, this
sample is likely to contain many more short-term welfare participants.  The format and the
explanatory variables are identical to that of Table 3A.  There are several differences in the
results, however.  First, and most important, the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid no36
longer has a significant effect on the probability of exiting welfare for employment, even in the
specification without year effects, and including the year effects actually results in a negative sign
(although the coefficient is not statistically significant).  Second, several of the variables,
including age, race, number of children, marital status, and the AFDC income limit are either
insignificant or only marginally significant, although all have the same signs as in Table 3A. 
However education, the number of children less than six years old, and the unemployment rate
have similar effects in both tables.
Tables 4A and 4B show the coefficients from hazards of exiting welfare without regard to
employment for interrupted and fresh spells, respectively.  (A woman may exit welfare for a state
other than employment through marriage or by receiving an increase in other income, for
example.)  The results in Table 4A are quite similar to those from the exit to employment
hazards, although several of the coefficients are smaller in magnitude.  The Medicaid variables
show a similar pattern for both spells, with the variables measuring the fraction eligible having
positive coefficients that are significant only when year dummies are not included.  The
coefficients from the fresh spells (Table 4B) are also similar to those from the exit to
employment hazards using fresh spells (Table 3B), although many of the coefficients in Table 4B
are smaller and few are statistically significant.
Employment and non-employment spells are considered in Tables 5, 6, and 7.  In Table 5
we look at welfare entry effects: how does expanded Medicaid eligibility affect the likelihood a
woman leaves employment for welfare?  For the most part the results are the opposite of those
for welfare exit in Tables 3 and 4, with the primary exception being the coefficient on the AFDC
income limit, which is small and not statistically significant in any specification.  Most of the37
Medicaid variables are negative, as would be expected if the availability of Medicaid retarded
entry into welfare, however the coefficients are never significant.  The control variables have the
expected sign, however, and are all statistically significant except for the variables for the
number of children younger than six and the dummy for widow.  
Tables 6 and 7 show our results from employment and non-employment exit hazards. 
Not surprisingly the coefficients on the control variables are of opposite signs, and most are
significant for both hazards.  The principal point of deviation from this pattern is in the AFDC
income limit variable, which appears to have no effect on exits from employment, but to have a
significantly negative effect on exits from nonemployment (indicating that higher AFDC income
limits lead to a lower probability of exit from non-employment).  In Table 6 the Medicaid
variables tend to have the negative sign predicted by theory only in the specifications with the
year effects, contrary to the results of previous tables, however once again the coefficients are
very rarely significant.  The signs of the Medicaid variables are consistently positive in Table 7
(with one exception), however they are again only significant when year variables are not
included.
Overall, the results presented above provide some evidence that expanded Medicaid
eligibility leads single mothers to exit welfare more quickly, however the effects are not robust to
the inclusion of year dummies and tend to be limited to the population of women who began the
sample on welfare.  This conclusion is somewhat surprising, given that previous research
(Yelowitz 1995) found a strong and robust relationship between expanded Medicaid eligibility
and increased labor force participation (and reduced welfare participation).  As a robustness
check and to more easily compare our results and previous studies which used cross-sectional34While these results differ from the results of Yelowitz (1995), they are similar to the results of Meyer and
Rosenbaum (1998) who include measures of Medicaid in estimates of the employment probability of single women.
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data, we estimate simple logits of AFDC participation and employment using our SIPP data
(accounting for the fact that we have repeated observations of the same individual in the
calculation of the standard errors).  We find results which are essentially the same as those that
we obtain from the hazard models (see Tables 8 and 9).  Among women who began the sample
on AFDC, the estimated effects of the Medicaid expansions are the expected sign and are
significant except when year dummies are added to the specification.  Among women who did
not begin the sample on AFDC, we find very little evidence of an effect of Medicaid eligibility,
with the estimated effects almost never being significant and often having the opposite sign from
the expected one.  When the two samples are pooled, the larger size of the sample without
interrupted spells (221,806 person-months as compared to 79,788 person-months) leads to
estimates which mimic the estimates for women who did not start the sample on AFDC: the
expansions appear to have had little effect on the overall sample.
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VI. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we lay out a framework to explore the impact of expanded public health
insurance coverage for children on transitions between welfare and work using a monthly hazard
rate model and data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  In this version of the
paper we estimate separate hazards for transitions into and out of employment and welfare,
estimating models for both interrupted and fresh spells for the case where there is no unobserved
heterogeneity in the hazard function.  We find some evidence that expanded Medicaid eligibility39
for children leads single mothers to exit welfare more quickly, however the effects are not robust
to the inclusion of year effects.  In addition, the effect appears to be strongest and most consistent
among long-term recipients (as proxied by recipients who begin the sample on welfare).  We find
less evidence of an effect of expanded Medicaid eligibility on transitions into welfare.  A
somewhat surprising finding is that higher AFDC income limits appear to have little effect on the
probability of such transitions out of employment or time spent off welfare.  To the best of our
knowledge, this is one of the first papers to examine welfare spells for women who began the
sample on welfare.  These women are more likely to consist of long-term recipients, which is
precisely the group of welfare recipients on which current welfare policy is focused.  
Clearly this research is a work-in-progress.  We are currently working on improving and
refining our analysis in several ways.  First, we plan to estimate the model accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity and incorporating alternative solutions to the seam bias problem in the
SIPP data.  Second, we are exploring alternative ways of parameterizing AFDC and Medicaid
eligibility and generosity in order to capture more fully which women were affected most
strongly by the expansions while controlling for the effects of the AFDC program.  Finally, we
are incorporating information from the SIPP topical modules on health and disability status (to
account for the fact that women who are unwell or disabled are less likely to exit AFDC) and the
start date of the current welfare spell (to improve our treatment of the interrupted spells).  40
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Table 1A: Means at First Month of Spell: Exits from Welfare
Welfare to Employment Welfare Ignoring Employment








Age 28.802 30.114 28.802 30.114
(0.135) (0.188) (0.135) (0.188)
Age 
2 893.441 974.569 893.441 974.569
(8.628) (12.364) (8.628) (12.364)
Highest Grade Completed 10.968 11.128 10.968 11.128
(0.038) (0.060) (0.038) (0.060)
Non-White 0.440 0.406 0.440 0.406
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Number of Children < 6 1.021 0.824 1.021 0.824
Years Old (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
Age of Youngest Child 4.174 5.145 4.174 5.145
(0.076) (0.106) (0.076) (0.106)
Number of Children 2.039 1.890 2.039 1.890
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024)
Divorced 0.239 0.287 0.239 0.287
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Separated 0.204 0.212 0.204 0.212
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Widowed 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.027
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Unemployment Rate 6.621 6.649 6.621 6.649
(0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036)
AFDC Income Limit 1229.47 1142.82 1229.47 1142.82
(First 4 Months) (7.467) (9.633) (7.467) (9.633)
Medicaid Income Limit for 1607.46 1601.72 1607.46 1601.72
Youngest Child (Maximum) (12.686) (17.557) (12.686) (17.557)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.523 0.576 0.523 0.576
Eligible Under Expansions (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.523 0.576 0.523 0.576
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Total Number of Spells 3498 1923 3498 1923
Number With No Transition 2555 1163 1886 931
Number With a Transition 943 760 1612 992
Mean Duration of Spells 16.638 8.878 16.579 8.788
(Months) (0.205) (0.178) (0.206) (0.179)
Mean Duration of Spells 17.845 9.942 21.106 11.556
With No Transition (Months) (0.247) (0.251) (0.297) (0.300)
Mean Duration of Spells 13.367 7.249 11.282 6.191
With a Transition (Months) (0.340) (0.222) (0.214) (0.163)44







Age 34.509 34.334 29.559
(0.092) (0.091) (0.115)
Age 
2 1261.230 1249.920 951.821
(6.482) (6.350) (7.505)
Highest Grade Completed 12.656 12.607 11.153
(0.027) (0.026) (0.032)
Non-White 0.270 0.276 0.368
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Number of Children < 6 0.455 0.471 0.905
Years Old (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Age of Youngest Child 8.586 8.433 4.841
(0.068) (0.066) (0.069)
Number of Children 1.559 1.574 1.856
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
Divorced 0.465 0.460 0.244
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Separated 0.245 0.245 0.226
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Widowed 0.056 0.054 0.054
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Unemployment Rate 6.384 6.391 6.601
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
AFDC Income Limit 982.14 991.13 1152.08
(First 4 Months) (3.931) (3.897) (5.560)
Medicaid Income Limit for  1197.64 1212.41 1522.83
Youngest Child (Maximum) (6.605) (6.540) (9.498)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.328 0.336 0.513
Eligible Under Expansions (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.327 0.334 0.513
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Total Number of Spells 8245 8638 5920
Number With No Transition 7856 5762 3900
Number With a Transition 389 2876 2020
Mean Duration of Spells 15.689 15.724 14.175
(Months) (0.132) (0.130) (0.153)
Mean Duration of Spells 16.056 18.785 17.118
With No Transition (Months) (0.136) (0.166) (0.197)
Mean Duration of Spells 8.283 9.589 8.493
With a Transition (Months) (0.390) (0.147) (0.176)
Note: All transitions are for spells in progress at start of sample.45
Table 2: Means of AFDC and Medicaid Eligibility Variables by Year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
AFDC Income Limit (in $) 793.99 845.67 924.00 1042.72 1113.67 1116.98 1150.23 1171.53 1204.75
Medicaid Income Limit for Youngest Child (in $: =
Max. of AFDC income limit and Medicaid limit)
793.99 847.80 944.47 1106.38 1314.90 1447.65 1737.35 1867.63 2055.34
Fraction of Children Age-Eligible 0 0.021 0.082 0.155 0.360 0.487 0.610 0.679 0.736
Fraction of Children Eligible if Mom Works 40
hrs/wk at Minimum Wage
0 0.020 0.081 0.155 0.360 0.487 0.610 0.679 0.736
Notes: Means calculated for all single mothers in sample as of January of the year indicated.  All variables are calculated at the monthly level. 
Income limits are in real (1981-1983) dollars.46
Table 3A: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Welfare to Employment: Welfare Spells In Progress At Start
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -0.138 -0.123 -0.131 -0.122 -0.131 -0.122
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 1.650 1.450 1.570 1.440 1.570 1.440
(0.460) (0.462) (0.462) (0.463) (0.462) (0.463)
Highest Grade Completed 0.072 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.070
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Non-White -0.148 -0.147 -0.146 -0.140 -0.146 -0.140
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Number of Children < 6 -0.284 -0.258 -0.284 -0.263 -0.284 -0.263
Years Old (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Age of Youngest Child -0.006 -0.009 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of Children -0.083 -0.052 -0.053 -0.063 -0.052 -0.063
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Divorced 0.541 0.527 0.539 0.530 0.539 0.530
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Separated 0.438 0.418 0.438 0.421 0.439 0.421
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Widowed 0.551 0.522 0.551 0.526 0.551 0.526
(0.237) (0.237) (0.238) (0.237) (0.238) (0.237)
Unemployment Rate -0.086 -0.099 -0.093 -0.099 -0.093 -0.099
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.330 -0.260 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340
(First Four Months) (0.129) (0.131) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.112)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 0.040 -0.090
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.068) (0.084)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.216 0.053
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.097) (0.126)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.221 0.061
Eligible Under Expansions (0.097) (0.126)
Log Duration -1.272 -1.274 -1.228 -1.262 -1.227 -1.261
(0.606) (0.610) (0.606) (0.609) (0.606) (0.609)
(Log Duration)
2 3.238 3.309 3.169 3.300 3.166 3.299
(0.697) (0.708) (0.697) (0.708) (0.697) (0.708)
(Log Duration)
3 * 10
-1 -17.374 -17.606 -17.038 -17.578 -17.028 -17.575
(2.853) (2.928) (2.858) (2.928) (2.858) (2.928)
(Log Duration)
4 * 10
-2 26.922 26.811 26.376 26.781 26.361 26.778
(3.823) (3.957) (3.831) (3.956) (3.831) (3.956)
Log Likelihood -4658.5 -4634.1 -4656.2 -4634.6 -4656.1 -4634.6
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).47
Table 3B: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Welfare to Employment: Welfare Spells Beginning After Start of Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -0.039 -0.031 -0.037 -0.032 -0.037 -0.032
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 0.355 0.206 0.332 0.216 0.330 0.212
(0.501) (0.506) (0.502) (0.507) (0.502) (0.507)
Highest Grade Completed 0.088 0.084 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.085
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Non-White -0.070 -0.061 -0.072 -0.063 -0.072 -0.063
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Number of Children < 6 -0.255 -0.232 -0.255 -0.228 -0.255 -0.228
years old (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
Age of Youngest Child 0.022 0.014 0.026 0.013 0.026 0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of Children 0.044 0.078 0.063 0.046 0.064 0.047
(0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
Divorced 0.198 0.202 0.201 0.195 0.201 0.195
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Separated 0.196 0.200 0.200 0.194 0.200 0.194
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Widowed 0.129 0.178 0.139 0.177 0.140 0.177
(0.249) (0.250) (0.249) (0.250) (0.249) (0.250)
Unemployment Rate -0.086 -0.050 -0.086 -0.051 -0.086 -0.051
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.160 -0.130 -0.170 -0.220 -0.180 -0.220
(First Four Months) (0.152) (0.154) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 0.033 -0.130
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.076) (0.095)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.138 -0.167
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.103) (0.140)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.146 -0.151
Eligible Under Expansions (0.103) (0.140)
Log Duration 0.499 0.538 0.501 0.539 0.501 0.539
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
(Log Duration) 
2 -0.190 -0.214 -0.192 -0.215 -0.192 -0.215
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Log Likelihood -3038.8 -3019.6 -3038.0 -3019.8 -3037.8 -3019.9
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).48
Table 4A: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Welfare to Non-Welfare: Welfare Spells In Progress at Start
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Age -0.044 -0.035 -0.038 -0.033 -0.038 -0.033
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 0.387 0.261 0.320 0.243 0.320 0.243
(0.372) (0.374) (0.373) (0.375) (0.373) (0.375)
Highest Grade Completed 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Non-White -0.082 -0.089 -0.081 -0.083 -0.081 -0.083
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Number of Children < 6 -0.052 -0.030 -0.055 -0.036 -0.055 -0.036
Years Old (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Age of Youngest Child 0.018 0.014 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.020
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of Children -0.034 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Divorced 0.165 0.159 0.163 0.161 0.163 0.161
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Separated 0.220 0.208 0.218 0.210 0.218 0.210
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Widowed 0.150 0.138 0.149 0.141 0.149 0.142
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194)
Unemployment Rate -0.061 -0.060 -0.066 -0.061 -0.066 -0.061
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.390 -0.330 -0.370 -0.390 -0.370 -0.390
(First Four Months) (0.098) (0.101) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 0.070 -0.070
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.051) (0.064)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.200 0.075
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.075) (0.098)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.201 0.077
Eligible Under Expansions (0.075) (0.098)
Log Duration -4.927 -4.991 -4.965 -5.001 -4.966 -5.002
(0.915) (0.918) (0.915) (0.918) (0.915) (0.918)
(Log Duration)
2 11.557 11.624 11.660 11.664 11.663 11.666
(1.753) (1.762) (1.755) (1.763) (1.755) (1.763)
(Log Duration)
3 * 10
-1 -84.759 -85.537 -85.678 -85.884 -85.702 -85.899
(12.457) (12.534) (12.474) (12.539) (12.474) (12.540)
(Log Duration)
4 * 10
-2 252.900 256.700 256.200 257.800 256.200 257.900
(37.744) (38.046) (37.807) (38.065) (37.807) (38.066)
(Log Duration)
5 * 10
-3 -268.000 -274.200 -272.100 -275.500 -272.200 -275.500
(41.213) (41.637) (41.295) (41.661) (41.296) (41.662)
Log Likelihood -7207.8 -7186.5 -7205.1 -7186.7 -7205.0 -7186.7
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).49
Table 4B: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Welfare to Non-Welfare: Welfare Spells Beginning After Start of Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.081 0.079 0.082 0.078 0.082 0.078
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 -1.510 -1.490 -1.520 -1.480 -1.520 -1.490
(0.486) (0.489) (0.486) (0.489) (0.486) (0.489)
Highest Grade Completed 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Non-White -0.066 -0.071 -0.068 -0.073 -0.068 -0.073
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Number of Children < 6 -0.035 -0.021 -0.034 -0.013 -0.034 -0.014
Years Old (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068)
Age of Youngest Child 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.020 0.027 0.020
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of Children 0.036 0.069 0.038 0.028 0.039 0.029
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Divorced 0.113 0.125 0.113 0.119 0.113 0.119
(0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.091)
Separated 0.219 0.235 0.219 0.226 0.220 0.226
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Widowed 0.252 0.286 0.258 0.283 0.258 0.283
(0.214) (0.215) (0.214) (0.215) (0.214) (0.215)
Unemployment Rate -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.380 -0.310 -0.420 -0.440 -0.420 -0.450
(First Four Months) (0.134) (0.136) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.020 -0.170
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.069) (0.088)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.036 -0.174
Mom works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.092) (0.125)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.042 -0.162
Eligible Under Expansions (0.092) (0.125)
Log Duration -5.326 -5.294 -5.324 -5.292 -5.324 -5.292
(1.100) (1.099) (1.100) (1.099) (1.100) (1.099)
(Log Duration)
2 12.322 12.259 12.315 12.250 12.314 12.250
(2.424) (2.422) (2.424) (2.422) (2.424) (2.422)
(Log Duration)
3 * 10
-1 -94.150 -93.700 -94.094 -93.622 -94.085 -93.622
(19.351) (19.328) (19.350) (19.324) (19.351) (19.323)
(Log Duration)
4 * 10
-2 295.700 294.500 295.500 294.200 295.500 294.200
(65.335) (65.234) (65.332) (65.216) (65.333) (65.213)
(Log Duration)
5 * 10
-3 -333.400 -332.300 -333.200 -332.000 -333.200 -332.000
(79.065) (78.918) (79.061) (78.888) (79.063) (78.883)
Log Likelihood -3649.8 -3636.0 -3649.7 -3637.0 -3649.7 -3637.2
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).50
Table 5: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Employment to Welfare: Employment Spells In Progress at Start
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -0.207 -0.205 -0.209 -0.209 -0.209 -0.210
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 2.370 2.340 2.390 2.390 2.400 2.400
(0.729) (0.731) (0.730) (0.732) (0.730) (0.732)
Highest Grade Completed -0.117 -0.119 -0.117 -0.118 -0.116 -0.118
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Non-White 0.605 0.601 0.607 0.597 0.607 0.597
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)
Number of Children < 6 -0.061 -0.044 -0.068 -0.026 -0.068 -0.025
years old (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.109)
Age of Youngest Child -0.063 -0.067 -0.066 -0.074 -0.066 -0.074
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Number of Children 0.349 0.376 0.355 0.341 0.354 0.339
(0.063) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Divorced -0.239 -0.241 -0.241 -0.235 -0.241 -0.234
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Separated -0.113 -0.109 -0.114 -0.104 -0.114 -0.104
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147)
Widowed -0.097 -0.093 -0.100 -0.080 -0.100 -0.079
(0.301) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302) (0.302)
Unemployment Rate 0.102 0.088 0.104 0.088 0.105 0.088
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.070 -0.006 -0.003 -0.050 0.001 -0.050
(First Four Months) (0.209) (0.215) (0.166) (0.171) (0.165) (0.171)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 0.059 -0.080
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.113) (0.140)
Fraction of Children Eligible if -0.002 -0.248
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.148) (0.190)
Fraction of Children Age- -0.013 -0.264
Eligible Under Expansions (0.149) (0.190)
Log Duration -0.379 -0.401 -0.375 -0.399 -0.375 -0.399
(0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054)
Log Likelihood -2434.7 -2425.1 -2434.9 -2424.4 -2434.9 -2424.3
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).51
Table 6: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Employment to Non-Employment: Employment Spells In Progress at Start
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Age -0.122 -0.120 -0.121 -0.120 -0.121 -0.120
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 1.350 1.320 1.340 1.320 1.340 1.320
(0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.268) (0.267) (0.268)
Highest Grade Completed -0.073 -0.075 -0.074 -0.075 -0.073 -0.075
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Non-White 0.253 0.250 0.252 0.248 0.252 0.248
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Number of Children < 6 years 0.012 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.013 0.023
old (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Age of Youngest Child -0.018 -0.020 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of Children 0.084 0.098 0.086 0.083 0.085 0.082
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Divorced -0.165 -0.166 -0.164 -0.163 -0.164 -0.163
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Separated -0.036 -0.033 -0.037 -0.032 -0.037 -0.032
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Widowed 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Unemployment Rate 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.017 0.024
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 0.000 0.033 -0.070 -0.090 -0.070 -0.090
(First Four Months) (0.084) (0.087) (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.050 -0.120
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.048) (0.057)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.034 -0.025
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.055) (0.068)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.028 -0.031
Eligible Under Expansions (0.055) (0.068)
Log Duration -4.680 -4.723 -4.690 -4.725 -4.689 -4.724
(0.628) (0.629) (0.628) (0.629) (0.628) (0.629)
(Log Duration) 
2 11.316 11.352 11.344 11.365 11.341 11.362
(1.250) (1.255) (1.251) (1.255) (1.251) (1.255)
(Log Duration) 
3 * 10
-1 -86.189 -87.024 -86.453 -87.140 -86.425 -87.112
(9.160) (9.209) (9.164) (9.210) (9.164) (9.210)
(Log Duration) 
4 * 10
-2 265.500 270.300 266.500 270.600 266.400 270.500
(28.506) (28.702) (28.522) (28.709) (28.522) (28.709)
(Log Duration) 
5 * 10
-3 -289.700 -297.300 -291.000 -297.700 -290.800 -297.600
(31.872) (32.151) (31.895) (32.159) (31.895) (32.159)
Log Likelihood -13375.4 -13347.6 -13375.7 -13350.0 -13375.8 -13349.9
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant  (not reported).52
Table 7: Estimated Coefficients from the Hazard Model
Transition from Non-Employment to Employment: Non-Employment Spells In Progress at Start
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age -0.034 -0.021 -0.032 -0.021 -0.032 -0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age 
2 * 10
-3 0.071 -0.100 0.056 -0.110 0.055 -0.110
(0.316) (0.317) (0.316) (0.318) (0.316) (0.318)
Highest Grade Completed 0.122 0.120 0.122 0.120 0.122 0.120
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Non-White -0.243 -0.240 -0.245 -0.239 -0.245 -0.239
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Number of Children < 6 -0.233 -0.208 -0.236 -0.210 -0.235 -0.210
Years Old (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Age of Youngest Child -0.010 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Number of Children -0.005 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.026 0.023
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Divorced 0.302 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Separated 0.183 0.160 0.177 0.160 0.177 0.160
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Widowed -0.021 -0.020 -0.025 -0.018 -0.025 -0.018
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Unemployment Rate -0.053 -0.036 -0.055 -0.036 -0.055 -0.036
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
AFDC Income Limit * 10
-3 -0.510 -0.450 -0.430 -0.470 -0.430 -0.470
(First Four Months) (0.094) (0.096) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
Medicaid Income Limit * 10
-3 0.114 -0.010
for Youngest Child (Maximum) (0.049) (0.062)
Fraction of Children Eligible if 0.152 0.034
Mom Works 40 hrs/wk at Min. (0.066) (0.086)
Fraction of Children Age- 0.157 0.042
Eligible Under Expansions (0.066) (0.086)
Log Duration 0.018 0.048 0.020 0.049 0.020 0.050
(0.076) (0.079) (0.076) (0.079) (0.076) (0.079)
(Log Duration) 
2 -0.121 -0.144 -0.122 -0.145 -0.122 -0.145
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Log Likelihood -9093.1 -9066.9 -9093.0 -9066.8 -9092.9 -9066.8
T i m e  D u m m i e s NYNYNY
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All equations include a constant (not reported).53
Table 8: Estimated Coefficients from Logit Models: 
Probability of Participating in AFDC
On AFDC at start Off AFDC at start
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.0235 -0.0222 -0.1637 -0.1679
(0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0329) (0.0330)
Age squared 0.0525 0.0545 0.2122 0.2149
(0.0450) (0.0458) (0.0487) (0.0490)
Highest grade completed -0.0782 -0.0774 -0.1528 -0.1550
(0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Non-white 0.0653 0.0745 0.4819 0.4810
(0.0728) (0.0745) (0.0820) (0.0818)
# children < 6 0.0859 0.0309 0.0676 0.1208
(0.0562) (0.0582) (0.0712) (0.0727)
Age of youngest child -0.0498 -0.0291 -0.0515 -0.0668
(0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0125)
# children 0.0019 0.0321 0.2740 0.2605
(0.0400) (0.0410) (0.0493) (0.0496)
Divorced -0.2471 -0.2586 -0.3674 -0.3651
(0.0871) (0.0893) (0.1061) (0.1065)
Separated -0.1741 -0.2054 -0.1053 -0.0972
(0.0971) (0.0999) (0.1043) (0.1045)
Widowed -0.6150 -0.6431 -0.6165 -0.5867
(0.2299) (0.2375) (0.2271) (0.2263)
Unemployment rate 0.1185 0.0924 0.0285 0.0377
(0.0203) (0.0231) (0.0211) (0.0254)
AFDC income limit 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Frac. elig. if mom -0.5097 -0.0141 0.4221 0.0036
works 40 hrs at min. (0.0831) (0.1118) (0.1005) (0.1279)
Year effects No Yes No Yes
# obs. 79788 79788 221806 221806
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for repeated observations for individuals.54
Table 9: Coefficients from Logit Models:
Probability of Being Employed
On AFDC at start Off AFDC at start
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFDC income limit -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Frac. elig. if mom  0.3102 -0.0454 -0.1029 0.0134
works 40 hrs at min. (0.0900) (0.1192) (0.0502) (0.0616)
Age -0.0634 -0.0661 0.1920 0.1939
(0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0184) (0.0185)
Age squared 0.0920 0.0933 -0.2548 -0.2566
(0.0544) (0.0546) (0.0259) (0.0260)
Highest grade completed 0.1658 0.1659 0.1530 0.1536
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Non-white -0.1083 -0.1162 -0.1415 -0.1399
(0.0821) (0.0826) (0.0468) (0.0469)
# children < 6 -0.3815 -0.3481 -0.1485 -0.1604
(0.0667) (0.0680) (0.0451) (0.0455)
Age of youngest child 0.0058 -0.0091 0.0275 0.0318
(0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0065) (0.0066)
# children 0.0104 -0.0080 -0.1621 -0.1559
(0.0448) (0.0452) (0.0307) (0.0307)
Divorced 0.4563 0.4646 0.3751 0.3746
(0.0980) (0.0991) (0.0570) (0.0571)
Separated 0.2430 0.2662 0.0606 0.0580
(0.1120) (0.1135) (0.0610) (0.0611)
Widowed 0.0884 0.1021 -0.6222 -0.6309
(0.2861) (0.2885) (0.0943) (0.0946)
Unemployment rate -0.0908 -0.0801 -0.0475 -0.0490
(0.0211) (0.0249) (0.0109) (0.0127)
AFDC income limit -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00003 -0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Frac. elig. if mom  0.3102 -0.0454 -0.1029 0.0134
works 40 hrs at min. (0.0900) (0.1192) (0.0502) (0.0616)
Y e a r  e f f e c t s NYNY
# obs. 79788 79788 221806 221806
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for repeated observations for individuals.